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Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission |
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Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission |
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基本信息·出版社：Vintage Books USA
·页码：400 页
·出版日期：2007年04月
·ISBN：0307276635
·条形码：9780307276636
·装帧：平装
·正文语种：英语
·丛书名：Vintage
·外文书名：史无前例: 9/11委员会内幕 (Vintage系列)
内容简介 The untold story of how the 9/11 Commission overcame partisanship and bureaucracy to produce its acclaimed report.
From the beginning, the 9/11 Commission found itself facing obstacles — the Bush administration blocked its existence for months, the first co-chairs resigned right away, the budget was limited, and a polarized Washington was suspicious of its every request. Yet despite these long odds, the Commission produced a bestselling report unanimously hailed for its objectivity, along with a set of recommendations that led to the most significant reform of America’s national security agencies in decades. This is a riveting insider’s account of Washington at its worst — and its best.
作者简介 Thomas H. Kean is a former governor of New Jersey (1982-1990) and from 1990 until last year the president of Drew University. He has served on numerous national committees and commissions and has worked tirelessly for over a quarter-century on behalf of a wide array of environmental and educational organizations. He lives in Bedminister, New Jersey.
Lee H. Hamilton is president and director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. From 1965 through 1999 he was a congressman representing Indiana's Ninth District. During his tenure, he was chairman and ranking member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs as well as the chair of the Joint Economic Committee and served on the Hart-Rudman Commission, whose 2001 report on national security first raised and examined the prospect of acts of terrorism against the U.S. prior to 9/11. He currently resides in Alexandria, Virginia.
编辑推荐 From Publishers Weekly A re-creation of the inner workings of a government commission threatens to be a dry bureaucratic procedural, but the 9/11 Commission was so politically fraught that its story is compelling in its own right. Chairman Kean and vice-chair Hamilton detail the commission's fight with Congress for more money and time; its wranglings with the Bush administration to win access to witnesses and classified documents; its delicate relations with victims' families, who were its harshest critics and staunchest champions; its strategic use of public censure to wring concessions from recalcitrant officials; and the forging of a bipartisan consensus among fractious Republican and Democratic commissioners. Their tone is evenhanded and diplomatic, but some adversaries—NORAD, the FAA, House Republicans—get singled out as stumbling blocks to the investigation. The authors cogently defend the compromises they made and swat conspiracy theories about coverups, but critics unhappy with the commission's refusal to "point fingers" or its lukewarm resistance to White House claims of executive privilege may not be satisfied. The issues the commission wrestled with—official incapacity to prevent disaster, the government's use and misuse of intelligence, presidential accountability—are still in the headlines, which makes this lucid, absorbing account of its work very timely. Photos.
(Aug. 15) Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
--This text refers to the Hardcover edition. From Booklist The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) was an exception to the rule that U.S. government publications are written in unreadable bureaucratese. Its plain English yielded sales of hundreds of thousands of copies, and its success indicates that a huge audience may exist for this account by the commission chairmen. Former politicians Kean and Hamilton adopt a chronological approach and a style dominated by descriptions of their investigative process: theirs is not a source for knowledge about the Islamic terrorist strikes of 2001. Information related to 9/11 does permeate the text, but it appears as the object of fact finding, such as the time line of the FAA's and NORAD's reactions to the hijackings. Along with the formal organization of the commission, Kean and Hamilton dwell on two habits of Washington that they worried would roil the commission: leaks and partisanship. As their narrative rolls forward, this leak or that partisan enters their story, whose most dramatic moments reside in the commission's televised hearings. These, one learns, had scant investigative value and were considered vehicles for educating the public about the terrible attacks. A continuation of that lofty aim, this volume's prominence is assured; less certain is the perseverance of average readers.
Gilbert TaylorCopyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved --This text refers to the Hardcover edition. Review “Terrific. . . an incisive overview about how our country makes national security policy.”—
Denver Post“Compelling.... The issues the commission wrestled with–official incapacity to prevent disaster, the government's use and misuse of intelligence, presidential accountability–are still in the headlines, which makes this lucid, absorbing account of its work very timely.” —
Publishers Weekly“Captivating.... Candid... Kean and Hamilton disclose disturbing information about breakdowns at the FBI, CIA, FAA, military commands and the White House that made it easier for terrorists to mount their attacks.” —
Philadelphia Star-TelegramFrom the Trade Paperback edition. --This text refers to the Kindle Edition edition. Review “Terrific. . . an incisive overview about how our country makes national security policy.”—
Denver Post“Compelling.... The issues the commission wrestled with–official incapacity to prevent disaster, the government's use and misuse of intelligence, presidential accountability–are still in the headlines, which makes this lucid, absorbing account of its work very timely.” —
Publishers Weekly“Captivating.... Candid... Kean and Hamilton disclose disturbing information about breakdowns at the FBI, CIA, FAA, military commands and the White House that made it easier for terrorists to mount their attacks.” —
Philadelphia Star-Telegram
