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One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander |  |
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One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander | |
On 2 April 1982 Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. The British response was swift, some said foolhardy. The mission of the Battle Group under the command of Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward presented a challenge that seemed all but insurmountable, and it was to require men of the highest calibre, professionalism and fortitude to carry it off. It also required exceptional leadership. On that day Admiral Woodward was on Fleet exercises in the Mediterranean; a tentative desire for action expressed in his diary was ironically fulfilled as he was thrown into an experience he could never have wished for, would never repeat, and certainly will not forget. From leaving Gibraltar to his return to Brize Norton, one hundred days elapsed--and, on the way, it had been a very close call. At times reflective and personal, at other times revealing the steely logic of a supreme military tactician, these engrossing memoirs take us south through the vast, lonely waters of the Atlantic as hopes for peace faded and strategies of war evolved, then became reality, victory and aftermath. They tell of the repulse of the Argentinian navy and the defeat of their air forces; of the sinking of the Belgrano; and of the daring amphibious landing at Carlos Water, eight thousand miles from home. One Hundred Days is unique as a dramatic portrayal of the world of modern naval warfare, where equipment is of astonishing sophistication but the margins for human courage and error are as wide as in the days of Nelson; and it is unique, too, in its revelations of the mind of the commander involved in planning one of this century's most audacious ripostes to an unwelcome invader.
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I had purchased the book and it set on a shelf until the death of the death of former Prime Minister Thatcher. At this time I decided to read the book.
In 1982 it was a rather close run affair that the British had retaking the Falklands from the Argentinian Military. The book starts with the low point of the British campaign - the sinking of HMS Sheffield - and then the book follows in chronological order until the Falkland's campaign. It was quite good and entertaining. At no point is the story slow. However, some parts are a lot faster than others. When the British task force is covering the Royal Army & Marines landing the results sort of reminds a casual reader of WWII: aircraft are lost and ships sunk at quite a rate. Admiral Woodward makes the observation that in the warfare the rate of ship to aircraft loss is about 10 Argentine aircraft to one ship, be it Frigate or Destroyer.
Admiral Woodward fights his forces and does an excellent job in the placement. The destroyers protect the carriers and in turn the carriers' aircraft of Harriers and Helicopters protect the fleet. Of particular note was observations of the British Missile Systems and the Type 42 Destroyers. The Type 42s were too wet in any seas, surprising for a British ship, and this affected the weapons systems. In many instances the weapons would not work because they were somewhat damaged by lack of protection in rough sea conditions. The two missile systems, Sea Wolf and Sea Dart, never quite performed to specifications and must have seemed very perplexing to both American & Soviet Observers at the time.
While the loss of Sheffield can be seen as the low point in the campaign the turning point is done by the British SAS. Every day they would attend the briefings and offer Admiral Woodward little. Then when he openly worried about being attacked by Argentinian fighter bombers the SAS said they could take them out. Woodward gave them 5 days to accomplish the mission and in exactly 5 days the mission was done. The US Military watched and has spent quite a bit of time and talent making US Army Delta Forces and Navy SEALs the equal of the SAS. What this small group of men did for the landing was invaluable.
Woodward admits the mistake of using the frigates as minesweepers, but at the time I think he had little choice. Additionally, while the British submarines are useful for checking the larger Argentinian Navy it's surprising they have limited stalking ability. With the exception of the nuclear power plants and some communication gear the sonar and sensor systems are not greatly improved from the prior WWII era and stalking the Aircraft Carrier 25th of May becomes extremely problematic in Woodward's view. He worries quite a bit about being caught in a pincer-attack like the American Navy was at the Battle of Guadalcanal in late 1942. The sinking of the Argentinian light cruiser - General Belgrano - removed the possibility of being caught in a pincer. Indeed, the Argentinian Brooklyn class cruiser had more firepower than the whole of Woodward's frigates and Destroyers. Still, he would have rather the submarines sunk the carrier 25th-of-May because the A-4 attack jets, operating from land bases, sank at least one of his ships.
This is an honest book with a good commander who expects the best of his subordinates. He is honest with his mistakes. He praises his men and talks about the defaults in his equipment. He views the U.K. as having been extremely lucky to have a good friend in the US government - which gave the British 100 war winning AIM-9L missiles and the Argentine government's poor timing as having invaded six months prior to the scheduled decommissioning of the ships that won the war.
This is a five star book on the last British colonial war. The men who fought it were truly the type of men who built the empire. Conversely, one sees too much modern media at play, such as when the BBC tells the Argentinian military the bombs were set incorrectly for the fuses and the BBC announces the time of an attack. It's amazing a few of the soldiers didn't get personal revenge on the writers and editors at the BBC.
I enjoyed this book and how a good commander helps defend one of the last British colonies. America would do well with such a government.
I read this in parallel with Hastings ("Battle for the Falklands"; published soon after the war and sadly inaccurate on details, but good for UK political background and overall coverage) and Middlebrook ("The Argentine Fight for the Falklands"; he had access to Argentine records and participants and is more accurate on details, with a good view from the other side).
Adm. Woodward's memoirs are required reading if you want to understand this complex land/sea/air campaign, because he was the one who was there and did it. The narrative is at times almost dipolar; sometimes thoughtful/insecure/self-effacing and at others cold/hard/kiss my arse. Hey, I never met an actual admiral, maybe that's how they are. The tactical details don't add much to what you get from other sources, but he does give a little in the way of logistics, a seldom appreciated aspect of strategic war. His respect and admiration for the men and officers under his command comes through loud and clear. Read it, you may not like it (or him) but you will definitely learn something.
Woodward had done a masterful job, with his writing assistant, of describing the issues of command, the concern about sending others into combat where they may lose their life, the need to keep in mind what is central about a mission, and so many other thoughts about what leadership means. This book is a study of BOTH (1) management of a large task (be it war, be it a large company or nonprofit, be it of government) when dealing with an adversary compelled to fight you (be it the other side in a war, be it a company fighting you for market share, be it a Democrat or Republican that believes as you do not), and (2) of management of a military war where weapons are wielded by you and weapons are wielded or threatened against you. The real-life drama of uncertainty of events, of certainty of purpose, and of just what went on in this saga is of interest to very many readers. I have British friends, I have Argentinian friends, and no matter which side you believe is right (both have their points) this is a good book about a mission one is given and how one needs to carry it out, and the thoughts and second-thoughts that must go through any leader's mind.
Read this as a book about leadership, and you will do fine. Read this as a book about war, and you will also do fine. Read this as a book about both, and you'll get even more out of it.
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