Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, The Great Recession, and the Uses-and Misuses-of History

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		Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, The Great Recession, and the Uses-and Misuses-of History
		Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, The Great Recession, and the Uses-and Misuses-of History

The Great Depression and the Great Recession are the two great economic crises of the past hundred years. While there are accounts of both episodes, no one has yet attempted a sustained comparative analysis. In Hall of Mirrors, Barry Eichengreen draws on his unparalleled expertise for a brilliantly conceived dual-track account of the two crises and their consequences. Rather than telling the stories of the two crises in sequence, instead he weaves them together. He describes the two bubble-fuelled build-ups, then the onset of crisis, the subsequent financial and economic and collapse, the policy response, and finally the recovery.

A theme of Eichengreen's narrative is that while the policy response to the Great Recession was importantly shaped by perceptions of the Great Depression ― contemporary policymakers did in fact learn lessons from the Depression that enabled them, this time, to prevent the worst ― they could have done better. Their failure to do so reflected a tendency to take the lessons of the Depression too literally, leading to an inability to recognize important respects in which circumstances, and specifically the structure of financial markets, had changed ― precisely in response to the policies put in place due to the Depression. In addition, success was the mother of failure: the success of the policy response took the wind out of reformers' sails. It diminished support for the kind of far-reaching social and financial reforms adopted in the 1930s. It allowed policy makers and society to prematurely indulge their desire for a return to normal policies before a normal economy had been restored. To be sure, this more recent crisis was better managed than the earlier one, which resulted in widespread social distress and, in the worst case, the rise of fascism. But a wiser collective response after 2008 would have staved off the painfully slow growth that subsequently plagued the United States and Europe.

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I held off writing this review until I had read the book thoroughly, an essential precaution I'm pretty sure several of the other reviewers have not taken. It's particularly important here because Eichengreen is making a very rich and nuanced case that cannot be distilled into a simple theoretically pure thesis. If you don't read it all, you're going to miss something important.

I have read many other books and articles about the Great Depression and the Great Recession, but I nevertheless found much that was new and illuminating in Eichengreen's treatment here. I've recently re-read his earlier Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939 (Nber Series on Long-Term Factors in Economic Development) which I feel is the best single stand-alone economic analysis of the Great Depression. (No, I'm not a committed true believer in "real business cycle" theories, or in liquidationism for that matter; if you are you probably won't like this book very well.) I'm not about to throw away my copy of Golden Fetters, which goes more deeply into some important details, but if you can only read one book on either the Great Depression or the Great Recession then Hall of Mirrors is the choice.

The great strength of the book lies in Eichengreen's masterful use of the comparative method of analysis, for he shows that considering both cycles in the same frame yields insights not to be gained from examining either alone. His method permits him to explain many features of each that would otherwise be quite puzzling.

Eichengreen is an economic historian rather than a theorist. There isn't an equation in the book; he has deliberately avoided abstract theorizing both to appeal to a broader audience and to assure a more complete and comprehensive perspective. I have no doubt that what he is saying will stimulate both theoretical and econometric work, some perhaps from his own pen. But this is the right place to start.

Early in the book, on page 9, Eichengreen says, "Where Keynes relied mainly on narrative methods, his followers used mathematics to verify their intuitions. Eventually those mathematics took on a life of their own. Latter-day academics embraced models of representative, rational, forward-looking agents in part for their tractability, in part for their elegance. In models of rational agents efficiently maximizing everything, little can go wrong unless government makes it go wrong." Which is a polite way of saying that economists of this stripe take "government" as a word of art, referring not to any actual institution but to the sum of "irrational" forces that they cannot model, or choose not to. If you are one such I suggest not reading this book, which will only bewilder and annoy you.

But if you are genuinely interested in understanding the Great Depression and Great Recession and have no fixed preconceived notions then I thoroughly recommend this book.

This is a very deep and analytical book. You better already have some serious understanding of the financial complexities of the 2007- 2008 Great Recession as well as some familiarity with the Treaty of Versailles and 1920's - '30's economic history in Europe, Asia, and the US. The basic premise is to show how decisions in the post-war period regarding reparations, war debt payments, currency stabilizations, gold, and The Great Depression were to some degree avoided in dealing with the 2007-2008 crisis. Lessons learned were utilized and kept the financial world from repeating policies that helped exacerbate the Great Depression. I've read clearer individual examinations of both The Great Depression and the financial hi-jinx involved in the Great Recession. Eichengreen refers to credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations, and spv's without much description. I am sure he's got an audience in mind that is already familiar with these. He also discusses the gold standard in detail, but isn't really trying to convey basic concepts to those not conversant with its intricacies. All this is just to say that the book is very detailed, thoroughly researched, and assumes you are ready for some esoteric argument and policy-wonk economic analysis. It's not an introduction to the complex monetary, fiscal, and political machinations that led to, dealt with, and helped solve two of the greatest financial crises in modern history. Eichengreen adroitly jumps back and forth between the two crises and dissects how each was affected by decisions taken - some coldly calculated, others made in the heat of the moment. This is an excellent book, but it's not for everyone.

From my perspective as a finance professional, if there is one book to read on the global financial crisis of 2008, this is it. Second best is probably Alan Blinders' "When the Music Stopped". Barry Eichengreen is a well known international finance economist who has written a number of popular works on the evolution of the international financial system. What distinguishes this book relative to its competition is how he draws on that background to put the events into a broader international and historical context. Because of his focus on history, he is particularly good at explaining why behavior, which at first glance looks counterproductive or even irrational, in fact is a reasonable response given the prevailing views at the time. However, if that comment makes him seem like an apologist for the prevailing order, don't be misled; there is no dearth of critical commentary. It just happens to be well-focused on what people should have been able to see and do. A good account and well written.

I have read several books on both the Great Depression and the Great Recession and this counts as one of the best for both and certainly the best for making comparisons, of which, as the author explains there are many. The book is written in a clear and easily accessible style. I particularly enjoyed the author's description of how his research on the Great Recession changed his view on the Great Depression (greater understanding for the policy uncertainty the decision makers were under). In classic Eichengreen style, the author asks whether an explanation also work in another time period or another country, which helps refine the argument. I learned a lot of new things in this book and I am looking forward to re-reading it soon.

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