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The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable [平装]（纳西姆·尼古拉斯·塔勒布 (Nassim Ni |  |
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The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable [平装]（纳西姆·尼古拉斯·塔勒布 (Nassim Ni | |
![The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable [平装]](http://img.reader8.com/uploadfile/2013/0323/20130323101918292.jpg)
Stephen J. Dubner, author of Freakonomics
'Great fun ... brash, stubborn, entertaining, opinionated, curious,
John Kay, Financial Times
'Hugely enjoyable - compelling'
Niall Ferguson, Sunday Telegraph
'Idiosyncratically brilliant'
Larry Elliot, Guardian
'A fascinating study of how we are regularly taken for suckers by the unexpected'
Economist
'A deeply intelligent, provocative book'
John Kay, Financial Times
'Like the conversation of raconteur ... hugely enjoyable - compelling ... Beware the Black Swan' --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
John Cornwell, Sunday Times
'The Black Swan confirms his status as a guru for every would-be Damien Hirst, George Soros and aspirant despot' --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
The Economist
'A deeply intelligent, provocative book ... Taleb succeeds in
bringing sceptical empiricism to the masses' --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
BusinessWeek
'A richly enjoyable read with an important message' --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
Time
'A provocative macro-trend tome in the tradition of The Wisdom of
Crowds and The Tipping Point' --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
《黑天鹅:如何应对不可预知的未来》：
上市以来，引发媒体大众热烈讨论，被译为31种语言，全球畅销
"可以预见，它在未来十年将是杰作。"
认识黑天鹅，认识不可预测的重大事件，
才能更深刻地理解世界的复杂性，并从不可预知的未来中获益。
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Great fun ... brash, stubborn, entertaining, opinionated, curious, cajoling Freakonomics An idiosyncratically brilliant new book Sunday Telegraph A fascinating study of how we are regularly taken for suckers by the unexpected Guardian Like the conversation of a raconteur ... hugely enjoyable - compelling Financial Times Confirms his status as a guru for every would-be Damien Hirst, George Soros and aspirant despot Sunday Times In the tradition of The Wisdom of Crowds and The Tipping Point Time
作者：(美国)纳西姆?尼古拉斯?塔勒布
纳西姆?尼古拉斯?塔勒布（Nassim Nicholas Taleb），当前最令人敬畏的风险管理理论学者。沃顿商学院企管硕士，巴黎大学博士，目前任纽约大学理工学院杰出教授。曾在纽约和伦敦交易多种衍生性金融商品，也曾在芝加哥当过营业厅的独立交易员。2001年2月正式成为衍生性金融商品交易战"略名人堂的一员。他在"9 11"之前大量买入行权价格很低，看似毫无价值的认沽权证，用一种独特的方式做空美国股市，直到恐怖分子劫持飞机撞向纽约世贸大楼，由此获利丰厚，一举成名。此次美国次贷危机爆发之前，他又先知先觉重仓做空，从中获利几百万美元。他的上一本畅销书《黑天鹅的世界》
（fooled by Randomness）以30种语言出版。Nassim Nicholas Taleb has devoted his life to immersing himself in problems of luck, uncertainty, probability, and knowledge. Part literary essayist, part empiricist, part no-nonsense mathematical trader, he is currently the Dean's Professor in the Sciences of Uncertainty at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. His last book, the bestseller Fooled by Randomness, has been published in eighteen languages. Taleb lives (mostly) in New York.
PROLOGUE
ON THE PLUMAGE OF BIRDS
Before the discovery of Australia, people in the old world were convinced that all swans were white, an unassailable belief as it seemed completely confirmed by empirical evidence. The sighting of the first black swan might have been an interesting surprise for a few ornithologists (and others extremely concerned with the coloring of birds), but that is not where the significance of the story lies. It illustrates a severe limitation to our learning from observations or experience and the fragility of our knowledge. One single observation can invalidate a general statement derived from millennia of confirmatory sightings of millions of white swans. All you need is one single (and, I am told, quite ugly) black bird.*
I push one step beyond this philosophical-logical question into an empirical reality, and one that has obsessed me since childhood. What we call here a Black Swan (and capitalize it) is an event with the following three attributes.
First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable.
I stop and summarize the triplet: rarity, extreme impact, and retrospective (though not prospective) predictability.* A small number of Black Swans explain almost everything in our world, from the success of ideas and religions, to the dynamics of historical events, to elements of our own personal lives. Ever since we left the Pleistocene, some ten millennia ago, the effect of these Black Swans has been increasing. It started accelerating during the industrial revolution, as the world started getting more complicated, while ordinary events, the ones we study and discuss and try to predict from reading the newspapers, have become increasingly inconsequential.
Just imagine how little your understanding of the world on the eve of the events of 1914 would have helped you guess what was to happen next. (Don’t cheat by using the explanations drilled into your cranium by your dull high school teacher). How about the rise of Hitler and the subsequent war? How about the precipitous demise of the Soviet bloc? How about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism? How about the spread of the Internet? How about the market crash of 1987 (and the more unexpected recovery)? Fads, epidemics, fashion, ideas, the emergence of art genres and schools. All follow these Black Swan dynamics. Literally, just about everything of significance around you might qualify.
This combination of low predictability and large impact makes the Black Swan a great puzzle; but that is not yet the core concern of this book. Add to this phenomenon the fact that we tend to act as if it does not exist! I don’t mean just you, your cousin Joey, and me, but almost all “social scientists” who, for over a century, have operated under the false belief that their tools could measure uncertainty. For the applications of the sciences of uncertainty to real-world problems has had ridiculous effects; I have been privileged to see it in finance and economics. Go ask your portfolio manager for his definition of “risk,” and odds are that he will supply you with a measure that excludes the possibility of the Black Swan–hence one that has no better predictive value for assessing the total risks than astrology (we will see how they dress up the intellectual fraud with mathematics). This problem is endemic in social matters.
The central idea of this book concerns our blindness with respect to randomness, particularly the large deviations: Why do we, scientists or nonscientists, hotshots or regular Joes, tend to see the pennies instead of the dollars? Why do we keep focusing on the minutiae, not the possible significant large events, in spite of the obvious evidence of their huge influence? And, if you follow my argument, why does reading the newspaper actually decrease your knowledge of the world?
It is easy to see that life is the cumulative effect of a handful of significant shocks. It is not so hard to identify the role of Black Swans, from your armchair (or bar stool). Go through the following exercise. Look into your own existence. Count the significant events, the technological changes, and the inventions that have taken place in our environment since you were born and compare them to what was expected before their advent. How many of them came on a schedule? Look into your own personal life, to your choice of profession, say, or meeting your mate, your exile from your country of origin, the betrayals you faced, your sudden enrichment or impoverishment. How often did these things occur according to plan?
* The spread of camera cell phones has afforded me a large collection of pictures of black swans sent by traveling readers. Last Christmas I also got a case of Black Swan Wine (not my favorite), a videotape (I don’t watch videos), and two books. I prefer the pictures.
* The highly expected not happening is also a Black Swan. Note that, by symmetry the occurrence of a highly improbable event is the equivalent of the nonoccurrence of a highly probable one.
What You Do Not Know
Black Swan logic makes what you don’t know far more relevant than what you do know. Consider that many Black Swans can be caused and exacerbated by their being unexpected.
Think of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001: had the risk been reasonably conceivable on September 10, it would not have happened. If such a possibility were deemed worthy of attention, fighter planes would have circled the sky above the twin towers, airplanes would have had locked bulletproof doors, and the attack would not have taken place, period. Something else might have taken place. What? I don’t know. Isn’t it strange to see an event happening precisely because it was not supposed to happen? What kind of defense do we have against that? Whatever you come to know (that New York is an easy terrorist target, for instance) may become inconsequential if your enemy knows that you know it. It may be odd to realize that, in such a strategic game, what you know can be truly inconsequential.
This extends to all businesses. Think about the “secret recipe” to making a killing in the restaurant business. If it were known and obvious then someone next door would have already come up with the idea and it would have become generic. The next killing in the restaurant industry needs to be an idea that is not easily conceived of by the current population of restaurateurs. It has to be at some distance from expectations. The more unexpected the success of such a venture, the smaller the number of competitors, and the more successful the entrepreneur who implements the idea. The same applies to the shoe and the book businesses–or any kind of entrepreneurship. The same applies to scientific theories–nobody has interest in listening to trivialities. The payoff of a human venture is, in general, inversely proportional to what it is expected to be.
Consider the Pacific tsunami of December 2004. Had it been expected, it would not have caused the damage it did–the areas affected would have been less populated, an early warning system would have been put in place. What you know cannot really hurt you.
Experts and “Empty Suits”
The inability to predict outliers implies the inability to predict the course of history, given the share of these events in the dynamics of events.
But we act as though we are able to predict historical events, or, even wore, as if we are able to change the course of history. We produce thirty year projections of social security deficits and oil prices without realizing that we cannot even predict these for next summer–our cumulative prediction errors for political and economic events are so monstrous that every time I look at the empirical record I have to pinch myself to verify that I am not dreaming. What is surprising is not the magnitude of our forecast errors, but our absence of awareness of it. This is all the more worrisome when we engage in deadly conflicts: wars are fundamentally unpredictable (and we do not know it). Owing to this misunderstanding of the casual chains between policy and actions, we can easily trigger Black Swans thanks to aggressive ignorance–like a child playing with a chemistry kit.
Our inability to predict in environments subjected to the Black Swan, coupled with a general lack of the awareness of this state of affairs, means that certain professionals, while believing they are experts, are in fact not. based on their empirical record, they do not know more about their subject matter than the general population, but they are much better at narrating–or, worse, at smoking you with complicated mathematical models. They are also more likely to wear a tie.
Black Swans being unpredictable, we need to adjust to their existence (rather than na?vely try to predict them). There are so many things we can do if we focus on anti knowledge, or what we do not know. Among many other benefits, you can set yourself up to collect serendipitous Black Swans by maximizing your exposure to them.
Learning to Learn
Another related human impediment comes from excessive focus on what we do know: we tend to learn the precise, not the general.
What did people learn from the 9/11 episode? Did they learn that some events, owing to their dynamics, stand largely outside the realm of the predictable? No. Did they learn the built-in defect of conventional wisdom? No. What did they figure out? They learned precise rules for avoiding Islamic prototerrorists and tall buildings. Many keep reminding me that it is important...
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