国际经济学理论与政策(下册):国际金融(第8版)

2013-01-19

the only way central banks could maintain adequate international reserve levels (barring deflation) was by accumulating dollar assets.

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		国际经济学理论与政策(下册):国际金融(第8版)
		国际经济学理论与政策(下册):国际金融(第8版)

国际经济学理论与政策(下册):国际金融(第8版) [平装]

　　作者简介

　　作者：(美国)保罗．R.克鲁格曼 (Paul R.Krugman) (美国)莫里斯．奥伯斯法尔德 (Maurice Obstfeld)

　　保罗．克鲁格曼(Paul R，Krugman)，普林斯顿大学教授，2008年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者，目前担任许多国家和地区的经济政策咨询顾问。他的主要研究领域包括国际贸易、国际金融、货币危机与汇率变化理论，被誉为当今世界上最令人瞩目的贸易理论家之一。

　　莫里斯．奥伯斯法尔德(Maurice Obstfeld)，毕业于麻省理工学院，获经济学博士学位。现任加州大学伯克利分校经济学讲座教授、美国国家经济研究局特邀研究员。他曾先后在哥伦比亚大学、宾夕法尼亚大学和哈佛大学任教，研究领域涉及国际金融和宏观经济学。

　　第3部分汇率和开放经济的宏观经济学

　　第12章国民收入核算与国际收支

　　第13章汇率与外汇市场：资产方法

　　第14章货币、利率和汇率

　　第15章长期价格水平和汇率

　　第16章短期产出和汇率

　　第17章固定汇率和外汇干预

　　第4部分国际宏观经济政策

　　第18章国际货币体系：1870-1973年

　　第19章浮动汇率制下的宏观经济政策和协调

　　第20章最优货币区和欧洲的经验

　　第21章全球资本市场：运行和政策问题

　　第22章发展中国家：增长、危机和改革

　　数学附录

　　第21章附录风险规避和国际资产组合的多样化

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　　文摘

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　　The external balance problem of the United States was different from the one faced by other countries in the Bretton Woods system. As the issuer of the Nth currency, the United States was not responsible for pegging dollar exchange rates. Its main responsibility was to hold the dollar price of gold at $35 an ounce and, in particular, to guarantee that foreign central banks could convert their dollar holdings into gold at that price. For this purpose it had to hold sufficient gold reserves. Because the United States was required to trade gold for dollars with foreign cen-tral banks, the possibility that other countries might convert their dollar reserves into gold was a potential external constraint on U.S. macroeconomic policy. In practice,however, foreign central banks were willing to hold on to the dollars they accumulated,since these paid interest and represented an international money par excellence. And the logic of the gold exchange standard dictated that foreign central banks should continue to accumulate dollars. World gold supplies were not growing quickly enough to keep up with w

　　rld economic growth, so the only way central banks could maintain adequate international reserve levels (barring deflation) was by accumulating dollar assets. Official gold conversions did occur on occasion, and these dep

　　eted the Amer-ican gold stock and caused concern. But as long as most central banks were willing to add dollars to their reserves and forgo the right of redeeming those dollars for Amer-ican gold, the U.S. external constraint appeared looser than that faced by other coun-tries in the system.